Sunday, August 17, 2003
Review of Dana Priest's The Mission
I read Dana Priest's The Mission last week, and am quite impressed. Not because I think the book is supremely well-written. But because it made me dramatically rethink my beliefs.
Dana Priest covers the military for the Washington Post. She used that experience--and a year and a half of work on this book--to explain how the role of the US military has drastically changed. We see reverberations of this in the squabbles between the State Department and Rummy. They're effectively fighting over method and control. What Priest provides is a detailed picture of how the military (largely since the end of the Cold War) has become the only effective entity working with a whole variety of nations around the world. In some cases, countries are simply too small for the US to maintain a diplomatic mission in the country; in other cases (like Indonesia), the military has more in common with the people who really run the country--the military--and they have the resources to make the most of this.
This much was a valuable picture, one which made me understand the conflict (and the stakes) between Rummy and Powell better. But what really challenged my understanding was the portrait of many of the military personnel Priest provides.
Take the example of General Anthony Zinni. The General got a lot of press before the war and since for his opposition to it. This has already gotten a lot of people on the left reconsidering this figure who otherwise is a caricature of the burly career military man.
What Priest adds to this is a picture of Zinni's empathy. As CinC of the Central Command in the Middle East, Zinni clearly developed an understanding of the issues and the people that is lacking, at least within the White House. There's a remarkable story, for example, of how the Saudis perceived him to be their protector in one discussion with Americans. They sat him in the seat of honor, and insisted he keep his hand in their lap throughout the whole discussion. Zinni was able to put aside American prejudices against homosocial contact, largely because he has invested enough in developing a cultural understanding of the issues, that he knew the stakes from the Saudi side.
This kind of empathy has gotten him in trouble--he has gotten in trouble, for example, for his understanding of the Palestinian perspective on the Middle East peace process. But it's clear that Priest judges this kind of empathy to be one of the advantages of the military's current involvement in all aspects of foreign policy.
I have to say that the whole Iraq war has drastically changed my preconceptions of military and CIA professionals. I'll admit it. But this gives a much more nuanced understanding of how the responsible and necessary features surfacing from the military have arisen from some really difficult situations.
I'll also say that the book made the problems with the UN a lot more clear to me. For example, the UN police used in Kosovo included a whole hodgepodge of forces from around the world. From developing nations, they were largely untrained, well-connected individuals looking for a good pay check. From the US, they were largely retired officers looking for a quick buck. Together, they end up being an uncoordinated mishmash with no good way to work together.
That said, the book does portray a scary picture. The US is relying on the military in any number of situations, most notably peace keeping and ongoing relationship building. When the military proved unwilling to cut ties with the Indonesian military for fear of losing all contact with that important country, it meant that we were implicated in the slaughter of thousands in East Timor (we provided military training to the people who conducted much of the slaughter). Because we are sending peacekeepers into Kosovo, Afghanistan, and (presumably) Iraq with primarily military tools, we can't do the things that will lead toward lasting peace: building civil society independent of warlords and thugs. I agree that the UN appears rather incompetent or difficult to work with (although their viewpoint is not really well represented in this book). But either we need to provide the military with the tools they need to really bring peace. Or we need to empower the UN and NGOs properly to get the job done. As it is, we're encouraging a kind of a warlordism that is likely only to spread. It is not just terrorism. We're encouraging a situation where all civil society development and diplomatic discussion comes with arms attached. And that can only contribute to long term insecurity, no matter what we can accomplish in the short term.
Dana Priest covers the military for the Washington Post. She used that experience--and a year and a half of work on this book--to explain how the role of the US military has drastically changed. We see reverberations of this in the squabbles between the State Department and Rummy. They're effectively fighting over method and control. What Priest provides is a detailed picture of how the military (largely since the end of the Cold War) has become the only effective entity working with a whole variety of nations around the world. In some cases, countries are simply too small for the US to maintain a diplomatic mission in the country; in other cases (like Indonesia), the military has more in common with the people who really run the country--the military--and they have the resources to make the most of this.
This much was a valuable picture, one which made me understand the conflict (and the stakes) between Rummy and Powell better. But what really challenged my understanding was the portrait of many of the military personnel Priest provides.
Take the example of General Anthony Zinni. The General got a lot of press before the war and since for his opposition to it. This has already gotten a lot of people on the left reconsidering this figure who otherwise is a caricature of the burly career military man.
What Priest adds to this is a picture of Zinni's empathy. As CinC of the Central Command in the Middle East, Zinni clearly developed an understanding of the issues and the people that is lacking, at least within the White House. There's a remarkable story, for example, of how the Saudis perceived him to be their protector in one discussion with Americans. They sat him in the seat of honor, and insisted he keep his hand in their lap throughout the whole discussion. Zinni was able to put aside American prejudices against homosocial contact, largely because he has invested enough in developing a cultural understanding of the issues, that he knew the stakes from the Saudi side.
This kind of empathy has gotten him in trouble--he has gotten in trouble, for example, for his understanding of the Palestinian perspective on the Middle East peace process. But it's clear that Priest judges this kind of empathy to be one of the advantages of the military's current involvement in all aspects of foreign policy.
I have to say that the whole Iraq war has drastically changed my preconceptions of military and CIA professionals. I'll admit it. But this gives a much more nuanced understanding of how the responsible and necessary features surfacing from the military have arisen from some really difficult situations.
I'll also say that the book made the problems with the UN a lot more clear to me. For example, the UN police used in Kosovo included a whole hodgepodge of forces from around the world. From developing nations, they were largely untrained, well-connected individuals looking for a good pay check. From the US, they were largely retired officers looking for a quick buck. Together, they end up being an uncoordinated mishmash with no good way to work together.
That said, the book does portray a scary picture. The US is relying on the military in any number of situations, most notably peace keeping and ongoing relationship building. When the military proved unwilling to cut ties with the Indonesian military for fear of losing all contact with that important country, it meant that we were implicated in the slaughter of thousands in East Timor (we provided military training to the people who conducted much of the slaughter). Because we are sending peacekeepers into Kosovo, Afghanistan, and (presumably) Iraq with primarily military tools, we can't do the things that will lead toward lasting peace: building civil society independent of warlords and thugs. I agree that the UN appears rather incompetent or difficult to work with (although their viewpoint is not really well represented in this book). But either we need to provide the military with the tools they need to really bring peace. Or we need to empower the UN and NGOs properly to get the job done. As it is, we're encouraging a kind of a warlordism that is likely only to spread. It is not just terrorism. We're encouraging a situation where all civil society development and diplomatic discussion comes with arms attached. And that can only contribute to long term insecurity, no matter what we can accomplish in the short term.
Thursday, August 14, 2003
It Is Not Enough to Describe the NeoCons
Okay okay, we've all discovered (or did so several years ago) the neo-cons and their evil plans for dominating the world. The news that they are behind many of Bush's policies has finally hit the news.
But for those of us who would like to do something about them, it is not enough to simply educate people on who and what they are.
We need to begin to analyze their weaknesses. I'm particularly interested in ways their policies can be used to split the right. For example:
This are just initial thoughts. But I think they're worth pursuing. There are a lot of moderate Republicans who are Rs because they're fiscal conservatives. But the D's don't seem to be actively pursuing them. That's a missed opportunity!
But for those of us who would like to do something about them, it is not enough to simply educate people on who and what they are.
We need to begin to analyze their weaknesses. I'm particularly interested in ways their policies can be used to split the right. For example:
Fiscal issues. The Cato Institute has already started to slam the Bush Administration for its fiscal irresponsibility. They're clearly not the only fiscally conservative Republicans who will abandon the Administration if their fiscal policies don't change.
Pax Americana. Some prominent Republicans have already started to get concerned about the Administration's clear goal of maintaining hegemony through force. I imagine sound Republicans like Dick Lugar also have qualms about this activity (note the recent Senate rule that would force the Administration to issue a finding before using Special Forces--thereby imposing some oversight on them).
Jewish versus Evangelical. A lot of people talked about the alliance between evangelical Christians and Jews with regards to Israeli politics. Much of this derives from Evangelical apocalyptic beliefs. But there is a natural limit to such an alliance. For example, there are some wacko born-agains who advocate for making the US a Christian, as distinct form Judeo-Christian, country. Leveraged correctly, this should introduce a split between the Christian Conservatives and the neo-cons.
This are just initial thoughts. But I think they're worth pursuing. There are a lot of moderate Republicans who are Rs because they're fiscal conservatives. But the D's don't seem to be actively pursuing them. That's a missed opportunity!
Monday, August 11, 2003
Max Cleland Shipped Off to Someplace Safe
More and more bloggers have been paying attention to the conflicts of interest of several members of the 9/11 Commission.
What has been missed, seemingly, is the news that Max Cleland has left the Commission [see bottom of article]. It seems that George Bush, the same man who accused Cleland of being unconcerned with security, as appointed him to the Import Export Bank.
The Import-Export Bank is the entity that provides American businesses the incentives they need to be willing to invest in emerging markets. They'll provide both money and security--basically backing business decisions that the private sector deems too risky. If you look at their recent press releases, the organization appears to be a convenient tool in Bush's larger geopolitical strategy. For one, the bank facilitates the use of business investment as a carrot to induce foreign governments to support our foregin policy. For example, it just supported a big investment in the Indian petrochemical industry, at a time when we're desparate for India to send troops to Iraq. Similarly, the bank will be one of the critical components in drumming up business investment in Iraq.
The decision, then, seems odd. The move seems to put Cleland in a position at the heart of Bush's strategy, but in a role that give him little power to affect that strategy. Moreover, given Cleland's recent outbursts against Bush, you wouldn't think Bush would appoint him to anything pleasant or lucrative. Even Rove doesn't seem capable of putting his instinct for revenge behind his instinct for political advantage.
Interestingly, it appears that the position has long been empty--it's not clear that any democrat has been in the position since the beginning of the Bush administration.
Further, it is interesting that the position appointment has not been announced--at least not by the Export-Import bank itself. The news that this has happened seems to have come through none other than Robert Novak, the same conservative columnist who helped the Administration out Ambassador Wilson's wife as a CIA operative.
There is something stinky about this appointment. Not only would the appointment remove perhaps the only person who will publicize any hanky panky on the 9/11 committee, but it will silence one of Bush's most strident critics.
What has been missed, seemingly, is the news that Max Cleland has left the Commission [see bottom of article]. It seems that George Bush, the same man who accused Cleland of being unconcerned with security, as appointed him to the Import Export Bank.
The Import-Export Bank is the entity that provides American businesses the incentives they need to be willing to invest in emerging markets. They'll provide both money and security--basically backing business decisions that the private sector deems too risky. If you look at their recent press releases, the organization appears to be a convenient tool in Bush's larger geopolitical strategy. For one, the bank facilitates the use of business investment as a carrot to induce foreign governments to support our foregin policy. For example, it just supported a big investment in the Indian petrochemical industry, at a time when we're desparate for India to send troops to Iraq. Similarly, the bank will be one of the critical components in drumming up business investment in Iraq.
The decision, then, seems odd. The move seems to put Cleland in a position at the heart of Bush's strategy, but in a role that give him little power to affect that strategy. Moreover, given Cleland's recent outbursts against Bush, you wouldn't think Bush would appoint him to anything pleasant or lucrative. Even Rove doesn't seem capable of putting his instinct for revenge behind his instinct for political advantage.
Interestingly, it appears that the position has long been empty--it's not clear that any democrat has been in the position since the beginning of the Bush administration.
Further, it is interesting that the position appointment has not been announced--at least not by the Export-Import bank itself. The news that this has happened seems to have come through none other than Robert Novak, the same conservative columnist who helped the Administration out Ambassador Wilson's wife as a CIA operative.
There is something stinky about this appointment. Not only would the appointment remove perhaps the only person who will publicize any hanky panky on the 9/11 committee, but it will silence one of Bush's most strident critics.
Monday, August 04, 2003
PNAC--Out of Date as Well as Being Out of Touch?
More and more often, people are discovering how solidly PNAC, the Project for a New American Century, is behind the Iraq war. Members of that organization--many of them in the current administration--advocated invading Iraq as long ago as 1997 (and members of the group advocated invading as early as 1992, in a rejection of the way we ended the Gulf War). That is as far as most people go, though, accusing the organization of some kind of conspiracy (although, as members of the organization rightly point out, they have never tried to hide what they were trying to do).
But what few people are asking is whether or not PNAC is right? That is, are their assumptions valid? Are their stated goals really in the best interest of the United States?
There are several answers to these questions. First, the question about their assumptions: it seems that they make assumptions about impending competition--largely in the form of China--that leads them to ignore other threats, the most obvious of which being terrorism.
With regards to whether or not their goals are in the best interest of most citizens of the US, we might look to the frequency with which organization papers use the terms "US liberty and prosperity " or similar such terms. They leave what they mean by the term very ambiguous. But many of the times they use it, they certainly seem to be referring to prosperity more than anything resembling political liberty. Which would suggest that, in a world in which corporations are not really tied to sovereign states anymore, you really should be making decisions that tie corporate success with political liberty.
Which leads me to the big point about PNAC doctrine. As I pointed out, much of the doctrine has been in place--in virtually the form it exists today--since the early 90s. It seems that they have not considered the rise of globalization very thoroughly (rather, they have considered it, but they have not adjusted their rhetoric to account for the globalization that has gone on). They have not adopted for some of the new "threats" that have arisen since the early 90s; this is particularly disconcerting, because one of their goals is to prevent coalitions that would rise against us, and they have not accounted for the changes in alignment that seem to be resulting in such coalitions, such as the greater alliance between India and China. And they have not considered the changes in the energy picture due to the rise of alternative sources and the greater surety that we are causing global warming. In other words, they are actively pursuing a strategic position based on fossil fuels. Yet it is not at all clear that fossil fuels will continue to have the same importance in the decades to come.
This, it seems to me, needs to be something the press more actively considers.
But what few people are asking is whether or not PNAC is right? That is, are their assumptions valid? Are their stated goals really in the best interest of the United States?
There are several answers to these questions. First, the question about their assumptions: it seems that they make assumptions about impending competition--largely in the form of China--that leads them to ignore other threats, the most obvious of which being terrorism.
With regards to whether or not their goals are in the best interest of most citizens of the US, we might look to the frequency with which organization papers use the terms "US liberty and prosperity " or similar such terms. They leave what they mean by the term very ambiguous. But many of the times they use it, they certainly seem to be referring to prosperity more than anything resembling political liberty. Which would suggest that, in a world in which corporations are not really tied to sovereign states anymore, you really should be making decisions that tie corporate success with political liberty.
Which leads me to the big point about PNAC doctrine. As I pointed out, much of the doctrine has been in place--in virtually the form it exists today--since the early 90s. It seems that they have not considered the rise of globalization very thoroughly (rather, they have considered it, but they have not adjusted their rhetoric to account for the globalization that has gone on). They have not adopted for some of the new "threats" that have arisen since the early 90s; this is particularly disconcerting, because one of their goals is to prevent coalitions that would rise against us, and they have not accounted for the changes in alignment that seem to be resulting in such coalitions, such as the greater alliance between India and China. And they have not considered the changes in the energy picture due to the rise of alternative sources and the greater surety that we are causing global warming. In other words, they are actively pursuing a strategic position based on fossil fuels. Yet it is not at all clear that fossil fuels will continue to have the same importance in the decades to come.
This, it seems to me, needs to be something the press more actively considers.
